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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES L. MILLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930567-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993), and Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in the body of the brief or 
in Addendum A: 
1) Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15. 
2) U.S. amend. IV. 
3) Utah Const, art. I, § 14. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. When an anonymous "citizen" caller alleges only that a 
described vehicle looks "suspicious", did the trial court err in 
concluding that such a claim constituted a reasonable articulable 
basis for an investigatory stop (and in not suppressing the involved 
evidence)? 
"In considering the trial court's action in denying 
defendant's motion to suppress, we will not disturb its factual 
evaluation unless its findings are clearly erroneous. However, in 
assessing the trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual 
findings, we afford it no deference but apply a 'correction of error 
standard.'" State v. Palmer, 802 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On August 12, 1993, James L. Miller moved to suppress 
evidence illegally obtained by an officer who had stopped Miller's 
car because an anonymous caller complained that it looked 
"suspicious." (R 53-82). The trial court denied the motion. (R 82). 
On that same day, Mr. Miller and the State also entered into 
a conditional plea in which Miller agreed to plead guilty to "theft, 
a Class A misdemeanor and . . . vehicle burglary, a Class A 
Misdemeanor." (R 83); (R 38-39). In exchange, the State agreed to 
dismiss two other accompanying charges. The theft charge originally 
was filed as a third degree felony. (R 83). 
The "Judgment, Sentence (Commitment)" form reflects a 
sentence of 12 months in the Salt Lake County Jail for the theft 
conviction. The court stayed the sentence, however, and placed 
Mr. Miller on probation. (R 38). Another 12 month jail sentence was 
imposed for the vehicle burglary conviction. That sentence, which 
ran concurrently with the theft sentence, also was stayed in favor of 
probation. (R 39). 
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On August 23, 1993, following the filing of Mr. Miller's 
"Petition and [the State's] Stipulation for [a] Certificate of 
Probable Cause", the trial court issued a certificate of probable 
cause and ordered that execution of the involved sentence be stayed 
pending resolution of the issues appealed. (R 35-37). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During a "graveyard" shift on May 19, 1993, Officer Michael 
Nunley "[g]ot a call of [a] suspicious vehicle . . ." (R 54-57). 
The anonymous citizen caller "didn't say what made it suspicious[;]" 
the report claimed only that "it was a red car with people in it[.]M 
(R 61-62). The number of occupants was unstated and no activity was 
alleged. (R 56). The "suspicious" vehicle was said to be in the 
area of 3357 West and 6775 South, although no specific business or 
residence was mentioned. (R 57). 
Upon noticing the first red car in the "general area," 
Officer Nunley "turned around and activated my overheads to stop the 
vehicle." (R 56-57). Nunley admitted that the car was not then 
engaged in any suspicious activity and that he did not know if the 
car ever was engaged in suspicious activity. (R 61). The car 
stopped without incident. (R 57). 
Other than the fact that the stopped car was red and 
contained occupants, Nunley did not know if the stopped car was the 
same car as the reported "suspicious" car. The State presented no 
evidence of a reported license plate number, or of the car's make or 
model, or any distinguishing feature. Officer Nunley acknowledged 
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that at the time of the stop, he had no knowledge that any crime 
whatsoever (with or without the car) had been committed. (R 62) . 
Nunley testified that the car (and its persons) were not free to go. 
(R 61). 
After the car had stopped, Officer Nunley approached the 
driver and "noticed a [car] stereo on the front seat between the 
driver and the passenger." (R 57). The wires on the stereo had been 
cut. (R 57). Nunley told the driver, James Miller, to exit the 
vehicle. (R 58). Nunley asked Miller where he was living and what 
he was doing. Nunley also asked about the stereo to which Miller 
responded that he "didn't know" anything about it. (R 58). The two 
men talked for approximately "four or five minutes," although only 
the "gist" of their conversation was included in the record. (R 62). 
According to Officer Nunley, Miller eventually said, "I want 
to come clean. I don't want to get in any worse trouble [than] I am 
now. I want to tell you my side of the story[.]" (R 58). Nunley 
claimed that he then read the "Miranda" rights to Miller. (R 59). 
Miller apparently explained that earlier in the evening, he had 
picked up three friends from work: "Travis, Richard and Kim." The 
passengers wanted to go "bumping" which is slang for "breakfing] into 
vehicles and steal[ing] things from them. (R 59). They went to 
three or four locations whereupon two of the passengers proceeded to 
"bump" vehicles. (R 59). 
While Nunley was conversing with Miller, other officers 
arrived on the scene and conducted a warrantless search of the car. 
(R 63). Nunley claimed that Miller "okayed" the search. (R 63). 
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Officer Nunley also interviewed the other occupants and ultimately 
arrested all of the involved persons. (R 60). The trial court 
denied Mr. Miller's motion to suppress evidence resulting from the 
stop. (R 82). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A complaint which alleges that there is a "suspicious" car 
in the neighborhood states nothing more than a conclusory and 
inarticulate hunch. This type of claim fails to justify the 
intrusiveness of a "level-two" seizure, particularly when the caller 
remains anonymous. Evidence resulting from such a detention 
constitutes illegal "fruits" and should be suppressed. 
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ARGUMENT 
A MERE HUNCH THAT A CAR LOOKS "SUSPICIOUS" IS AN 
INADEQUATE AND INARTICULATE BASIS FOR AN INVESTIGATORY 
VEHICLE STOP 
A. THERE WAS A "SEIZURE" WHEN THE OFFICER 
ACTIVATED HIS OVERHEAD LIGHTS AND PULLED 
OVER A CAR 
"It is well settled that a police officer's stop of a 
vehicle is a 'seizure' and therefore subject to fourth amendment 
protections." State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). The parties 
do not dispute that when officer Nunley saw Mr. Millers vehicle, 
Nunley "turned [his patrol car] around and activated [his] overheads 
to stop the vehicle." (R 57) (officer Nunley's testimony). 
The lower court, however, ruled that there was only an 
"informational stop" notwithstanding the court's acknowledgment that 
the stopped persons also were not free to leave. (R 79-80); but see 
State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah App. 1991) (citations 
omitted) ("[a]s long as the person 'remains free to disregard the 
questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that 
person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require 
some particularized and objective justification7"). 
The court wrongly equated the stop to a voluntary 
police/citizen "level one" encounter. See State v. Deitman# 739 
P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per curiam). The vehicular stop constituted a 
"level two" encounter, an intrusion requiring a reasonable 
articulable suspicion. See id.; Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15. 
"Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally 
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guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused 
to sanction. And simple 'good faith on the part of the arresting 
officer is not enough.'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968), 
quoted in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987). 
B. A DISPATCH REPORT COMPLAINING GENERALLY OF A 
"SUSPICIOUS" CAR FAILED TO ARTICULATE A 
LEGITIMATE BASIS FOR BELIEVING THAT ANYONE 
WAS INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
In addition to mislabeling the encounter, the lower court 
also erred in concluding that the stop was proper. "[A] 'brief 
investigatory stop of an individual by police officers is 
permissible when the officers "have a reasonable suspicion, based on 
objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal 
activity.,f/" Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88 (quoting State v. Carpena# 
714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)); State v. Swaniqan, 699 
P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); accord Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-7-15 ("A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act or committing or is attempting to commit a public offense 
and may demand a name, address and an explanation of his actions"). 
In the case at bar, there was little more than "a call of 
[a] suspicious vehicle." The dispatched report "didn't say what 
made it suspicious" and merely claimed that "it was a red car with 
people in it[.]" (R 54-57; 61-62). No activity whatsoever was 
alleged. (R 56). The report simply alleged that the "suspicious" 
vehicle was in the area of 3357 West and 6775 South. (R 57). 
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Despite the paucity of facts available to officer Nunley, 
as soon as he saw a red car in the general vicinity he "activated 
[his] overheads to stop the vehicle." (R 56-57); cf. State v. 
Beerbohm, 229 Neb. 439, 427 N.W.2d 75, 79 (1988) (emphasis added) 
("It is noteworthy that [the officer] did not stop Beerbohm's 
automobile as soon as he located it, based solely upon the 
information relayed to him by radio"); State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 
592, 595 (Utah App. 1992) ("It is axiomatic that presence at or near 
the [location], without more, does not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity"). Nunley admitted that the car was 
not then engaged in any suspicious activity and that he did not know 
if the car was ever engaged in suspicious activity. (R 61). The 
car stopped without incident. (R 57). 
By his own concessions, officer Nunley failed to articulate 
sufficient facts for the intrusion.1 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 500 (1983) ("It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the 
seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion 
1. The State bears the burden of proving that the 
intrusion was justified. See State v. Lopez# 831 P.2d 1040, 1049 & 
n.16 (Utah App. 1992) ("the State first has the burden to show . . . 
that the officer had . . . a reasonable suspicion to believe that a 
traffic violation had occurred"), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1992); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987) ("In 
order to justify this seizure, Officer Beesley must point to 
specific, articulable facts which, together with rational inferences 
drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
Trujillo had committed or was about to commit a crime"); State v. 
Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 676 (Utah App. 1991) (Orme, J., dissenting) 
("It is the State's burden to show that the seizure it seeks to 
justify was sufficiently limited to satisfy the conditions of a 
level-two stop"). 
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was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the 
conditions of an investigative seizure"). The dispatched report 
lacked the necessary factual foundation to support the stop. 
The factual deficiencies were compounded by the uncertain 
and unproven nature of the source, a caller whose identity remained 
anonymous. See supra note 1 (the State presented no evidence of the 
caller's identity); State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 258 (Utah App. 
1992) ("an anonymous tip could not be the basis for a stop where 
there was no indicia of reliability and the officer's observation 
did not corroborate the tip") (construing State v. Black, 721 P.2d 
842 (Or. App. 1986)).2 Beyond the questionable nature of the 
source, at the very least there must be an appropriately detailed 
complaint prior to dispatching a police bulletin based on a "tip" by 
an anonymous citizen caller. 
Although a stop may be based upon a bulletin sufficiently 
grounded in articulable facts, "[i]f the flyer [or bulletin] has 
been issued in the absence of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in 
the objective reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment." 
2. See also State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 835 (Utah App. 
1991) (the reliability of the information or the informant's 
credibility may be doubted when there is a confidential informant 
involved); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 732 n.6 (Utah App. 1992) 
(Orme, J., dissenting) ("no showing of reliability or specificity 
. . . [when] [t]he information [was, inter alia,] from an 
unidentifiable source concerning a rumor about about the defendant's 
behavior in the past"), cert, granted, (Utah June 18, 1993); cf. 
Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d 847 (1974) ("Even 
assuming 'credibility amounting to sainthood, the judge still may 
not accept the bare conclusion . . . of a sworn and known and 
trusted police-affiant"). 
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State v. Bruce# 779 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985)).3 
For example, in State v. Thompson, 231 Neb. 771, 438 N.W.2d 
131 (1989), "the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the stop of 
defendant's vehicle was illegal because the police dispatch reported 
only a 'suspicious car in a certain area7 without relaying a basis 
for the suspicion." See Roth, 827 P.2d at 258 (construing Thompson, 
438 N.W.2d 131). The report here was similarly unfounded, stating 
vaguely that there was a "suspicious" vehicle in the neighborhood. 
(R 54-57; 61-62). The report "didn't say what made it 
suspicious[,]" only that "it was a red car with people in it[.]" 
(R 61-62). But cf. State v. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. App. 
1991) ("the facts corroborated were easily obtained facts and 
conditions which by themselves are inadequate to support a 
finding . . . " ) ; People v. Abbott, 84 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43 (Cal. App. 
3. Accord State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 649-50 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 
560 (1971) (if the officer responsible for a police bulletin lacked 
the appropriate basis for its issuance, "an otherwise illegal arrest 
cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the 
instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the 
arrest")). Police cannot rely on another person's unfounded 
suspicions—even if that person is another officer. State v. Black, 
721 P.2d 842, 844 (Or. App. 1986); State v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 659, 
661 (Neb. 1977). Otherwise, one officer could use another to 
circumvent articulating the requisite constitutional basis. Id. "A 
police officer who arrived at the 'suspicion,' 'belief or 'mere 
conclusion' that narcotics were in someone's possession could not 
obtain a warrant. But he could convey this conclusion to another 
police officer, who could then secure the warrant by swearing that 
he had 'received reliable information from a credible person' that 
the narcotics were in someone's possession." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108, 114 n.4 (1964). 
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1970) (citation omitted) ("The required corroboration must relate to 
essential fact. . . . Facts which are unrelated to a criminal 
activity on the part of defendant are insufficient to provide that 
corroboration of an untested declarant which is required"). 
In Playle v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747 
(Minn. App. 1989), a dispatched report informing investigating 
officers of "the mere possibility of a drunk driver" was held to be 
invalid. See Roth, 827 P.2d at 257 (construing Playle, 439 N.W.2d 
747). The report here contained even greater deficiencies than the 
speculative transmittal in Playle. Rather than referring 
specifically to a "drunk driver", the conclusory report below only 
complained generally of a "suspicious" vehicle. In both cases, the 
dispatched report constituted an inarticulated hunch. 
In State v. Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985) (per curiam), 
an officer en route to investigate a reported burglary noticed two 
individuals in the same vicinity who "allegedly 'stared' at [the 
officer] as he drove by." Ld. at 719. The officer called "dispatch 
and requested broadcast of an 'attempt to locate' the two 
individuals he had seen." ^d. Two men fitting the general 
description were later stopped and detained. Evidence, including 
property from the burglarized residence, were uncovered during the 
seizure. 
On appeal, the State confessed error. Id. at 719. "The 
stop was based solely on a description by a fellow officer who had 
observed the two walking along the street at a late hour in an area 
where recent burglaries had been reported." Id. In the present 
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case, no burglaries were reported and officer Nunley did not know if 
any crimes had been committed. (R 62) . The stop occurred at 
approximately 3:00 a.m., but as alluded to above, the time of day 
cannot justify the stop. See Swanigan, 699 P.2d at 719; see also 
State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah App. 1987) (no reasonable 
suspicion existed when "[t]he initial decision to stop was based 
merely on the lateness of the hour and the high-crime factor in the 
area"). Contrary to the lower court's reading of Swaniqan, (R 76), 
if the police in Swaniqan improperly relied on an officer's report 
of a suspicious "staring", the reliance here on a citizen's report 
of a suspicious car was equally unconstitutional. See also supra 
note 2 & accompanying text. 
Finally, instead of focusing on objective facts then known 
to officer Nunley at the time of the stop, the court relied on facts 
later discovered by the officer as a basis for justifying the stop. 
See (R 82) (emphasis added) (according to the court, officer Nunley 
"did stop [the car] and asked for information and got enough 
evidence for himself to have reasonable cause to detain that 
person"). "After-the-fact" information, however, may not be used to 
validate a stop. See State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 668 n.3 (Utah 
App. 1991) (emphasis added by the court) ("Of course, only facts 
known to the officers at the time they stopped defendant's vehicle 
are relevant"); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988) 
("The fact that his 'hunch' proved correct is 'perhaps a tribute to 
his policeman's intuition, but it is not sufficient to justify, ex 
post facto, a seizure that was not objectively reasonable at its 
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inception'"); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543 (1990) (per curiam) 
("That reasoning, however, 'justify[ing] the arrest by the search 
and at the same time . . . the search by the arrest,' just 'will not 
do'") . 
Even well intended investigations contain constitutional 
limitations and must be conducted (or initiated) in accordance with 
appropriate authority. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15; Utah Const, 
art. I, § 14; U.S. Const, amend. IV. The stop was illegal. The 
court improperly reasoned that officer Nunley could "get further 
information as to why that vehicle was in that particular location 
at that time." (R 80). 
C. ALL "FRUITS" RESULTING FROM THE UNLAWFUL 
DETENTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
"Absent reasonable suspicion, evidence derived from the 
stop is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and must be excluded." State 
v. Steward# 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. 
Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988)); see also 763 P.2d 
at 1217 n.2; State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985) (per 
curiam) ("the stop was based on a mere hunch rather than the 
constitutionally mandated 'reasonable suspicion'; consequently, the 
confiscated evidence was erroneously admitted at trial"); Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).4 The court below erred in 
4. Cf. State v. Grovierf 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 
1991) ("the State has the burden of showing that the consent was 
voluntarily given"); State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687-88 (Utah 
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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not suppressing all of the evidence resulting from the unlawful 
detention. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Miller respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
lower court's suppression ruling and to deem inadmissible the 
evidence resulting from the unlawful detention. 
SUBMITTED this DM day of November, 1993. 
5. 
R0NAI1D S. FtJJiNO 
At torney f o r D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
PAUL M. GRANT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
4 -[footnote continued]-
1990) ("When the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent 
after an illegal police action, the prosecution 'has a much heavier 
burden to satisfy than when proving consent to search' which does 
not follow police misconduct"); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983) (burden of proving consent "is not satisfied by showing a 
mere submission to a claim of lawful authority"); Bumper v. North 
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 466 
(Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted) ("courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived"); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 
(Utah 1993) ("If the court determines that the consent was not 
voluntary, no further analysis is required; the consent is invalid, 
and the proffered evidence must be excluded"); Carter, 812 P.2d at 
469 ("[e]ven where the government proves the consent is voluntary, 
such consent cannot justify a search if the otherwise voluntary 
consent was obtained through the exploitation of an antecedent 
police illegality"); Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 960 ("The 'fruit of the 
poisonous tree' doctrine has been extended to invalidate consents 
which, despite being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation of 
a prior police illegality"). 
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ADDENDUM A 




Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 





[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
